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Enacting Life

In psychology and neuroscience, we describe organisms as perceiving, learning, remembering and acting, and we measure the behavioral and neural processes associated with those capacities, often to good effect. But these descriptions do not necessarily tell us how anything comes to matter to the organism in the first place, which is a question about how the capacities we study relate to the life of the organism whose capacities they are. Philosophers have asked versions of this question for a long time, but since it bears on what our measurements can establish, it is a question for psychologists and neuroscientists as well.

Recent developments in artificial intelligence have made these matters harder to set aside, since language models can now produce sophisticated responses and take part in exchanges that change what people understand and do. Their performance raises the question of what behavior can establish about understanding, and also the question of how a system without a living perspective of its own can nonetheless shape human sense-making. Enactivism offers one way of thinking through these questions, because it begins with the organization of living things rather than with outward performance.

Enactivism names a family of approaches to the study of mind, one influential statement of which came in The Embodied Mind (1991), where Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch drew on earlier work by Humberto Maturana and Varela on the organization of living things. Different theorists have since taken that account in different directions, and they disagree on important questions, including whether cognition involves representation and how much an account of mind should weigh lived experience.

These readings follow the biological or autopoietic strand of enactivism, which grows out of Maturana and Varela’s account of living organization. The starting point is that perceiving and knowing are activities of living systems, whose continued existence depends on maintaining their own organization. Some conditions support that continued existence, while others threaten it. But this alone does not explain how something comes to matter to an organism. Later enactivists have addressed this question by considering how living systems regulate their activity in ways that contribute to maintaining the conditions of their continued existence. This leads to the idea that an organism has a perspective on its surroundings, even in a minimal sense, such that things can matter to it according to the kind of living system it is and its history of interaction with the world. Whether and how such a perspective is related to subjective experience remains an open question that the readings do not tackle.

I wrote these readings as a psychologist and neuroscientist trying to work out what this literature might offer, and I intend them especially for readers in psychology and neuroscience who have no background in philosophy. They examine what changes in our explanations when we begin from the living organism, and where this way of thinking remains open to question. The emphasis throughout is on bodily form and activity, rather than on lived experience, which is central to other strands of enactivism. The readings also reflect my particular interests, rather than attempting a comprehensive survey of the field. The About page explains these choices and how the readings came to be.

Embodiment and Enactivism

What does embodiment mean beyond having a physical body? Starting with a single cell, this reading introduces autopoiesis, the organization through which a living system produces and maintains itself. It follows the question of what can matter to a living being from cells to animals and persons, and considers what self-production explains and what further ideas are needed to account for sense-making.

Enacting Worlds

What does it mean to enact a world? Beginning with color, the main example of enaction in The Embodied Mind, this reading traces how the idea developed into later accounts of sense-making. It then sets out my own account of how perspective relates to living form and activity, and uses the bats in my backyard to ask what science can tell us about another animal’s world and what remains beyond our access.

What Are We Explaining?

Using Maturana’s work on vision, this reading asks how explanations of neural mechanisms relate to psychological descriptions of what an organism is doing. It considers how an observer’s distinctions enter into scientific explanation, then follows Maturana’s account of language and shared ways of making distinctions.

What Makes Living Things Different?

Machines can respond to changing conditions and pursue goals, so what is distinctive about living activity? This reading asks how having to maintain itself bears on what an organism can do and on what can matter to it. It also considers development, and how each generation reconstructs a viable way of life from resources and relations inherited from earlier generations.

Coda: AI and Human Sense-Making

Language models raise questions about language and understanding, and about what embodiment has to do with either. The coda asks what their abilities give us reason to reconsider, and how using AI can change what people come to understand and care about and what they become able to do.

For a complementary account of how living beings develop, see About Development.

About

Why a psychologist and neuroscientist came to write about enactivism, and how the readings were written and revised, including the use of AI tools.

Further Reading

Further reading on lived experience, development, neuroscience, critiques and open problems, and other strands of enactivism.

Licensing and Citation

How the readings may be reused and cited, including the archived Version 1.0 and its DOI.