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Enacting Life

How does anything come to matter to a living being? Psychology and neuroscience often explain the mind by asking how the brain receives information about the world and processes it. Much has been learned this way. But this leaves a question about the living being whose brain it is: how does there come to be a meaningful world for it at all?

A living being is not a passive recipient of information from the world. It is an active participant in its own life. What it does shapes what it encounters, and those encounters shape its continuing activity. Perceiving and acting belong to this ongoing life, in which things can go better or worse for the being itself. What matters to it is inseparable from the kind of being it is and how its ways of living have developed. For us, those ways of living include relationships with other people, and the meanings we share with them.

Enacting Life is a freely available set of introductory readings that explores these ideas through enactivism, an approach to mind that begins with the activity of living beings in their surroundings. Four readings ask what this starting point changes about our understanding of mind and behavior, and about the explanations we construct in psychology and neuroscience. A coda considers what AI can tell us about human sense-making, and how using AI may change us.

I wrote these readings as a psychologist and neuroscientist trying to work out what this literature has to offer. They are intended especially for readers with a background in those fields, but assume no prior knowledge of philosophy. They follow the biological strand of enactivism, with less attention to its treatment of lived experience. The About page says more about the questions behind the readings and how they came to be.

Embodiment and Enactivism

What does embodiment mean, and what does the enactivist approach add to our understanding of the relationship between the body and the mind? This reading explores the idea of self-production (autopoiesis) and how things come to matter to a living being, and follows the argument from cells to persons.

Enacting Worlds

What does it mean to enact a world? Starting from color, the main example in The Embodied Mind, this reading introduces enaction and its later development as sense-making. It separates different ways of thinking about an organism’s perspective, and uses the bats in my backyard to ask what science can tell us about another animal’s world and what it leaves open.

What Are We Explaining?

Using Maturana’s work on vision, this reading asks how neural mechanisms relate to psychological phenomena and how the observer’s own descriptions enter into scientific explanation. It then follows Maturana’s account of language and shared ways of making distinctions.

What Makes Living Things Different?

A living thing has to keep producing the organization that keeps it alive. This reading traces what follows from that requirement for what an organism can do and what can matter to it. It also looks at how a viable way of life is built anew in each generation.

Coda: AI and Human Sense-Making

A language model can answer us, and its answer can change what we think. Does that mean it understands anything, or that anything matters to it? The coda takes up these questions and considers how using AI may shape our developing capacities and concerns.

For a complementary account of how living beings develop, see About Development.

About

Why a psychologist and neuroscientist came to write about enactivism, the questions about mind and life behind the readings, and how they were written and revised, including the use of AI tools.

Further Reading

Suggestions for further reading, grouped by topic.

Licensing and Citation

How the readings may be reused and how to cite them, including the archived Version 1.0 and its DOI.