Enacting Life
In psychology and neuroscience, we describe organisms as perceiving, learning, remembering and acting, and we measure the behavioral and neural processes associated with those capacities, often to good effect. What these descriptions tend to leave aside is how anything comes to matter to the organism in the first place, which is a question about how the capacities we study relate to the life of the organism whose capacities they are. Philosophers have asked versions of this question for a long time, but because it bears on what our measurements can establish, it is a question for psychologists and neuroscientists as well.
Recent developments in artificial intelligence have made the question harder to set aside, since language models can now produce sophisticated responses and take part in exchanges that change what people understand and do. Their performance raises the question of what behavior can establish about understanding, and also the question of how a system without a living perspective of its own can nonetheless shape human sense-making. Enactivism offers one way of thinking through these questions, because it begins with the organization of living things rather than with performance.
Enactivism names a family of approaches to the study of mind, one influential statement of which came in The Embodied Mind (1991), where Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch drew on earlier work by Humberto Maturana and Varela on the organization of living things. Enactivists have since taken that account in different directions, and they disagree on important questions, including whether cognition involves representation and how an account of mind should weigh lived experience against biology.
These readings follow the biological or autopoietic strand of enactivism, which grows out of Maturana and Varela’s account of living organization. Its starting point is that perceiving and knowing belong to the activity of a living system that has to keep producing and maintaining the organization through which it exists, so that some conditions sustain it and others undermine it whether or not an observer describes them. Self-production does not by itself explain how something can matter to an organism, and the readings follow later enactivists in looking to the way an organism regulates its own activity in relation to those conditions. On that basis they examine the proposal that a living thing has a perspective in a minimal sense, in that its surroundings can matter to it in ways that depend on the kind of living system it is, while leaving open how such a perspective relates to subjective experience.
Psychology and neuroscience already include many accounts of perception as active, and work on active sensing and active inference examines how perception and action shape one another. Active inference in particular is a broader framework than enactivism, and how it relates to enactivist accounts of living organization is disputed, so the readings do not set up a simple contrast between those approaches and enactivism. Instead, they ask what comes into view when we relate perception and action to the organization of a living being and to what can matter to it.
I wrote these readings as a psychologist and neuroscientist trying to work out what this literature might offer, and I intend them especially for readers in psychology and neuroscience who have no background in philosophy. They examine what changes in our explanations when we begin from the living organism, and where this way of thinking remains open to question. Because they focus on bodily form and activity, they do not offer a sustained account of lived experience, even though it is central to much enactivist writing, and they say more about why I find this strand useful than about the criticisms it has faced or the other strands of enactivism. The About page explains these choices and how the readings came to be.
Embodiment and Enactivism
What does embodiment mean beyond having a physical body? Starting with a single cell, this reading introduces autopoiesis, the organization through which a living system produces and maintains itself. It follows the question of what can matter to a living being from cells to animals and persons, and considers what self-production explains and what further ideas are needed to account for sense-making.
Enacting Worlds
What does it mean to enact a world? Beginning with color, the main example of enaction in The Embodied Mind, this reading traces how the idea developed into later accounts of sense-making. It then sets out my own account of how perspective relates to living form and activity, and uses the bats in my backyard to ask what science can tell us about another animal’s world and what remains beyond our access.
What Are We Explaining?
Using Maturana’s work on vision, this reading asks how explanations of neural mechanisms relate to psychological descriptions of what an organism is doing. It considers how an observer’s distinctions enter into scientific explanation, then follows Maturana’s account of language and shared ways of making distinctions.
What Makes Living Things Different?
Machines can respond to changing conditions and pursue goals, so what is distinctive about living activity? This reading asks how having to maintain itself bears on what an organism can do and on what can matter to it. It also considers development, and how each generation reconstructs a viable way of life from resources and relations inherited from earlier generations.
Coda: AI and Human Sense-Making
Language models raise questions about language and understanding, and about what embodiment has to do with either. The coda asks what their abilities give us reason to reconsider, and how using AI can change what people come to understand and care about and what they become able to do.
For a complementary account of how living beings develop, see About Development.
About
Why a psychologist and neuroscientist came to write about enactivism, and how the readings were written and revised, including the use of AI tools.
Further Reading
Further reading on lived experience, development, neuroscience, critiques and open problems, and other strands of enactivism.
Licensing and Citation
How the readings may be reused and cited, including the archived Version 1.0 and its DOI.