About
Enacting Life grew out of an interest in different ways of thinking about the mind. In psychology and neuroscience, perceiving and knowing are commonly understood in terms of a brain processing information about a world whose features are already specified. Enactivism offers a different starting point: it asks how cognition arises through the activity of a living being.
As described at peterjmarshall.com, my background is in developmental psychology and neuroscience, although my undergraduate training was in zoology. I became interested in ideas around enactivism and embodiment in part because they raised questions about assumptions I had become accustomed to working with. But following those questions took me into philosophical literature that my training had done relatively little to prepare me for. I began writing the documents in Enacting Life as a way of working through that literature for myself, and I hope that in the longer term they will be useful to others.
Enacting Life is a companion to About Development, which asks how organized living beings and their capacities develop. The two resources approach overlapping questions from different starting points, and each can be read on its own. Both connect to my article “Psychology in 2125” in Perspectives on Psychological Science; see the background and commentary at peterjmarshall.com.
Why Enactivism?
Attempts to bring the living organism back into psychology and neuroscience often run up against a division inherited from the history of Western thought. Some of the questions raised in Enacting Life go back to Aristotle, who understood living things in terms of their organization and the capacities that organization made possible. Plants could nourish themselves and grow, animals could also perceive and move, and humans could reason. These capacities differed, but Aristotle understood them as part of a continuous account of life.
In the seventeenth century, Descartes drew a much sharper distinction. He wanted to explain the natural world, including living bodies, in mechanical terms, through the arrangement and motion of their parts. But he did not believe that human thought could be explained in this way. His solution was to treat the human mind as a distinct thinking substance, separate from the machinery of the body. This distinction also supported the Christian belief that the soul could survive bodily death.
Mechanical explanations of living bodies and brains proved to be very productive. Explaining their functions through the physical workings of organs, tissues, and cells made possible much of modern physiology, neuroscience, and medicine. The point is not that we should have stayed with Aristotle, or that these achievements were somehow a mistake. But the division between mind and body left a problem that those achievements did not by themselves resolve: how to understand mind as part of the life of an organism.
These readings do not attempt to resolve the problem of mind and body, and readers may reach the end without a clear answer to what the mind is. But they do suggest that what slips from view in the standard approach to psychology is not so much the mind as the living being whose mind we are trying to understand. So what draws me to enactivism is not the promise of a better answer to what the mind is, but the possibility of a psychology and neuroscience that keeps the living being in view.
In the readings, I focus mainly on the account of living organization developed by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, and on what follows from it for understanding cognition. My purpose is to explain why I find this line of thinking useful, although the readings give less attention to criticisms of it. I also do not devote much space in the readings to the various threads of enactivist thought and their current status. Other strands include the sensorimotor approach of O’Regan and Noë (2001), which explains perceptual experience in terms of mastery of the ways sensory input changes with movement, and the radical enactivism of Hutto and Myin (2013), which rejects mental content in basic forms of cognition.
Some have argued that the scientific achievements of enactivism have fallen short of some of its early ambitions, a problem acknowledged in a recent special issue of Adaptive Behavior (Meyer et al., 2026). Some of its central ideas also remain contested, and some psychologists dismiss it outright because it is associated with approaches that eschew any role for representation in the study of mental life, most prominently Hutto and Myin’s radical enactivism. But the question of representation needs more careful treatment than this broad characterization allows; What Are We Explaining? examines this issue by distinguishing between descriptions of an organism’s conduct and explanations of the mechanisms through which it acts.
In my view, enactivism can make us reconsider what we are trying to explain scientifically, how we decide what to measure, and how our accounts of mechanisms connect to the conduct we want to explain. I think this approach can lead to better scientific explanations, but that remains an open question.
For me, though, the appeal of enactivism goes beyond its scientific promise. It offers a way of thinking about what it means to be a living being. The form and organization of a body make possible particular ways of acting in and encountering the world. A living form exists only through its own activity, and so has a perspective: things can go better or worse for it, in ways shaped by its organization and history. This raises questions about being human, but also about the lives of other organisms whose ways of being in the world may be very different from ours. This way of thinking about living beings is central to the argument I make in Psychology in 2125.
The idea of structural coupling can also change how we think about our relations with other people. Our earlier encounters shape what we find in new ones, as well as how we respond. When people interact over time, they become part of one another’s histories, changing how each responds to the other. Maturana’s account of language raises related questions about how we understand one another and how our ways of talking shape what we can think. So for me, enactivism offers a way of thinking about living, as well as about how we study living things.
How the Readings Were Made
I began developing Enacting Life in 2022. I wrote in Google Docs and embedded the documents on a Google Site. Knowing that the readings were publicly available, even without much of an audience, encouraged me to make the explanations as clear as I could. But the readings were initially as much for my own benefit as anyone else’s.
Over time, I wanted to bring the material together into a freely available educational resource that would offer others a way into some difficult ideas and explain why they might matter for the science of the mind. In 2026, I moved the readings to GitHub Pages using Quarto, making them easier to read and navigate.
I should be clear about what kind of resource this is. I am a psychologist and neuroscientist, not a philosopher, and I did not set out to read everything written about enactivism and produce a comprehensive treatment of it. That would likely have taken me years, and it was never going to happen alongside my other work. Instead, I took parts of the literature and tried to develop my own understanding of them, and my early versions of these readings were not very good. The revisions described in the note on AI use below made them clearer and more accurate, although they also risked making the readings sound more assured than my understanding of every part of them. But what I hope they offer is a way into these ideas from psychology and neuroscience, from someone working in those disciplines.
Nor have the readings been peer reviewed. Some of the framing they use first appeared in published articles I wrote that went through peer review (e.g., Marshall, 2016; Marshall et al., 2021), but my accounts of Maturana and Varela’s work, and of the enactivist literature that followed it, have not been checked by anyone working in philosophy. That is where errors are most likely, and I would be grateful to hear about them, and about disagreements, at peter.marshall@temple.edu. Corrections will go into later versions, which are listed in the version history.
A Note on AI Use
In summer and fall 2026, as I moved these readings to GitHub Pages, I worked on revising them with the assistance of AI tools, specifically Claude and ChatGPT. The tools helped me compare arguments across the individual documents and find clearer ways of putting things, and they suggested further connections for me to consider. Although the original drafts were mine, the final product was the result of a lot of back and forth with AI tools. The resulting resource is, I think, more coherent and accessible than it was before.
But there is a tension in using AI in this way. One of the ideas running through Enacting Life is that meaning is not in the marks on a page. The writing on which these systems were trained was produced through human activities in which words meant things to people. The systems can work with patterns in that writing without sharing the activities that gave it significance. Yet I used these systems to help me explain precisely that point. The Coda considers this issue more generally; here it matters because of how the readings themselves were made.
The enactivist perspective is not one uniform thing. It is sprawling and diverse, with different historical strands and interpretations. Although Enacting Life is meant as an introduction to enactivist ideas, it would not be enough simply to list the different perspectives and say: here they are, make of them what you will. AI tools can list the different approaches but cannot determine which ones mattered for the account I was trying to give. That was for me to work out: what to include, what to leave out, and where to stop, given the limits of my understanding. Working with the tools made that clearer to me.
In reflecting on all of this, I have asked whether working with AI to finalize this resource has helped me understand the ideas better. I think it has. I could probably give a lecture or two on enactivism without notes. They may not be the greatest lectures ever on the topic, but I hope someone new to these ideas would come away understanding more – which is the same spirit in which I offer these readings.
The usefulness of AI tools does not resolve questions about the human intellectual work on which they depend and how that work was obtained, or about the interests that guide their development. I remain conflicted about these tools, even as I came to rely on them for finalizing this resource, and I am writing about these questions elsewhere. I take responsibility for what appears in these readings, while recognizing that the process of producing them involved more than my own unaided writing.
References
Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing enactivism: Basic minds without content. MIT Press.
Marshall, P. J. (2016). Embodiment and human development. Child Development Perspectives, 10(4), 245–250. https://doi.org/10.1111/cdep.12190
Marshall, P. J., Houser, T. M., & Weiss, S. M. (2021). The shared origins of embodiment and development. Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience, 15, 726403. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnsys.2021.726403
Maturana, H. R. (1980). Biology of cognition. In H. R. Maturana & F. J. Varela, Autopoiesis and cognition: The realization of the living (pp. 5–58). D. Reidel. (Original work published 1970)
Meyer, R., Stendera, M., & Russell, J. (2026). Prospects for the science of enaction: Introduction to the special issue. Adaptive Behavior, 34(4–5), 247–251. https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123261469743
O’Regan, J. K., & Noë, A. (2001). A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(5), 939–973. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X01000115